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On Nietzsche’s Judgment of Style
and Hume’s Quixotic Taste
On the Science of Aesthetics and “Playing” the Satyr

Babette Babich
Abstract: I read Nietzsche’s discussion of scholarly judgments of style
beginning with his own inaugural lecture at Basel together with David Hume’s
stylistic reflections in his “On the Standard of Taste.” This casts light both on the
context and the substance of Nietzsche’s own scholarly concern with the question
of style and taste in terms of what Nietzsche called the “science of aesthetics”
and consequently of scholarly judgment in both classics (or classical philology,
here including archaeology and historiography) and philosophy. I also include
a brief discussion of Nietzsche’s phenomenological performance practice of
dance or playing the “satyr.”

Toward Classical Philology as the “Science of Aesthetics”:
On Style

“H

omer und Classical Philology,” Nietzsche’s 1869 inaugural lecture at the
University of Basel, addresses not only the history of the Homer problem
as a problem but also raises the question of the discipline of classical philology
as science (which notion of science also includes the question of philology as
philosophy). Thematically, Nietzsche’s first lecture as a professor of classical
philology focuses on the significance of style as such. In this meta-scholarly
context, the issue of scholarly discernment is explored in terms of aesthetic
judgment, as a judgment of taste, a focus Nietzsche subsequently resumes in
the second of his Untimely Meditations, “On the Utility and Liability of History
for Life.”1 To be sure, an explicit focus on style runs throughout Nietzsche’s
later work—as the work of many scholars attests, beginning indeed even before
Derrida’s Èperons/Spurs and continuing well after Nehamas’s Life as Literature.
It is important to add that this same interest in the question of style is rendered
more complicated by Nietzsche’s achievements as an exemplary stylist of the
German language: one who literally “does things” with words.2
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Such a complex constellation in both the substance and texture of Nietzsche’s
work illuminates the metonymic force of his theoretical emphasis in his lecture
on the “so-called Homer question” with regard to the question of style as such
and the theme of what he calls “personality,” as we recall Nietzsche’s observation
in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks that it is only “personality” that
survives the refutation of this or that philosophical or systematic claim (KSA 1,
p. 801; cf. KSA 1, p. 803). Thus engaged by the associative dynamic that is the
engine of equivocation, we are hard put to separate Nietzsche’s talk of the personality of Homer from the Homer question concerning the existence/nonexistence
of the historical poet.3 The same metonymy has also had the effect of distracting
readers from attending to either the issue of personality as such or the broader
Homer question. Captivated by Nietzsche’s writerly “style” and thus distracted
as a reader, one can find oneself “disattending” to what Nietzsche himself tells us
about what is conventionally supposed to be a Homeric style. And sure enough,
even when we attend to Nietzsche’s style, scholars often neglect Nietzsche’s own
aesthetic reflections on style and, and this is no coincidence, because this same
neglect also happens to characterizes the majority of contemporary readings of
Nietzsche’s thinking on science, both in the philosophy of science proper and
in the context of classical philology.4
By coordinating the “science” of aesthetics as Nietzsche does here in his
inaugural lecture as well as in his first book on tragedy (where the term makes
an appearance in his very first sentence), Nietzsche foregrounds the pleonastic
nature of aesthetics as such, characterized in his inaugural lecture in terms of
classical philology’s “centauric” nature.5 Modern conceptions of scientific and
scholarly disciplines attribute a more uniform, monological character to science as well as to aesthetics, both of which are regarded as distinct disciplines.
Scholars are wary of mixing or crossing disciplines, and we often imagine ourselves to be making radically innovative gestures when we suggest, always from
the internal perspective of our respective professions, the supposedly scholarly value of an interdisciplinary approach. At the same time, there has never
been more insularity in the academy than in the present day—an insularity not
characteristic of Nietzsche’s nineteenth century, whatever its other limitations.
A Whiggish approach to the disciplines may be to blame for this increasing
narrowness even as scholars claim to value breadth. Just as “science” per se is
thought to be one and the same thing everywhere in our own era as in Nietzsche’s
day (and over millennia and as conceived across disparate cultural traditions), so
aesthetic questions of “art” are similarly thought to be unchanging (in substance)
from one era to another.6
Speaking of style in the context of both art and scientific scholarship, Nietzsche
takes up the notion of style as a literal, scientific distinction to be explored in a
formal fashion and in an expressly historical context. Thus Nietzsche adumbrates
a discussion of cultural taste in the hermeneutic context of scholarly judgment.
It is by means of style that the scholar is first able to identify or “distinguish”
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works of art or literary texts as such, to attribute works of sculpture or pottery
to this or that era and this or that artist, to classify jewelry, temple offerings,
cylindrical seals, and so on. Similarly, it is on the basis of style that scholars
can characterize literary works as poetic, religious, philosophical, historical and
so forth It should go without saying, though it may not, that a many of these
traditional distinctions have come to be questioned if not as a result of a revolution in scholarly sensibilities of the sort Nietzsche argued for in his lecture, then
owing to empirical contradictions and the inevitably monumental witness, as
Nietzsche would say, of new archaeological work.7
Characterizing the exemplary application of matters of style as a critique of
scholarly judgment, Nietzsche is able to conceive the quintessentially classical
Homer question in a tradition going back not only to Goethe and Schiller but
to the famed first philologist Friedrich August Wolf and, before Wolf, to the
philological tradition of the Greeks themselves in the Alexandrian twilight of
their own era. As Nietzsche explains: “The zenith of the historical-literary studies of the Greeks, and hence also of their point of greatest importance—i.e., the
‘Homer question’—was reached in the age of the Alexandrian grammarians.”8
This grammarian regime began with a return to the ancient institution of a contest
between Homer and Hesiod and thence and also a return to the origination of the
texts themselves and therewith the institution of philology as such, which may,
as Nietzsche reminds us, be dated to the reign of Pisistratus, as it was then that
the oral compositions associated with Homer were first “gathered together” in
“bookish form.”9 Nietzsche thus frames the standard Homer question as “the
question concerning Homer as a personality.”10 Accordingly, he goes on to raise
the question concerning the personal (or real) existence of Homer qua individual
writer versus the alternate account of a collective tradition of folk poetry and its
oral transmission by questioning this same opposition.
If by Homer one seeks the first singer of heroic epic song, that first singer,
so Nietzsche argues, cannot be Homer. Not if one means by Homer the poet
who was the greatest or consummate artist of his kind. If Homer is an artistic
genius—and here Nietzsche invokes the Kantian and indeed eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century convention of genial individuality—then Homer “could
hardly be the first of his kind.”11 In this sense, and however it is decided, the
so-named Homer question is never actually posed as a real question or as such;
that is—and it is this that Nietzsche takes as his theme overall—one does not
begin to raise the question concerning the scientific or classically philological
tradition of posing such a question. It is in this context that Nietzsche reminds
us in an earlier formulation of his lecture that “there is in modern aesthetics no
more dangerous opposition than that between folk poetry and artistic poetry,”
that is, no more dangerous contrast than that between the conception of the
collective tradition of folk poetry and individual poetic genius.12 The question
for Nietzsche is not the question of the historical existence of either folk poetry
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or individual poets (he notes that ancient conventions name individual poets
at the head of folk traditions) but much rather the very Kantian and Schillerian
traditional question of aesthetic scholarly judgment whereby “the poetic genius
may not create folk poetry”—at least not deliberately or consciously so—
because the idea or stylistic notion of folk poetry is itself a traditional aesthetic
judgment.13
In this way Nietzsche argues that under Pisistratus, “Homer” becomes the
name for a man of wondrous and, as Nietzsche writes in his earlier draft, “mythic”
poetic powers, that is, an “immaculate and unerring artist,” but at the same time,
Homer is also “humanized” (“vermenschlicht”) as such.14 Thus Nietzsche argues
that what is at stake in the issue of the Homer question is not as much a matter
of historical transmission as of aesthetic, that is to say, stylistic judgment.15 The
problem is thus that the Homer question tends not to be posed as “question” at
all in Nietzsche’s sense (and one might here argue that Heidegger learned much
of what he knew about authentic questioning from Nietzsche). The critical point
of questioning is the heart of Nietzsche’s epistemological rigor in his own discipline and beyond—a rigor most scholarship whether in classical philology or
philosophy tends to find difficult to see, so absorbed is it in reducing the unknown
to the known, as the later Nietzsche reflects: “First principle: any explanation is
better than none” (TI “Errors” 5).
Regarded hermeneutically, then, Nietzsche’s first lecture resuscitates the
Homer question as a question that he directs in good antique fashion and speaking
as a philologist contra the philologists themselves, and this is the primary reason
that the classicist William Arrowsmith was so concerned to have his discipline
engage Nietzsche.16 So earnest was Arrowsmith (and he was otherwise very
unearnest) that he included Nietzsche’s notes for “We Philologists” in the very
first issue of the new series of Arion, an engagement the classicists themselves
have yet to take up and toward which they certainly feel no urgency.17
Regarded phenomenologically, Nietzsche offers a Vergegenwärtigung of the
Homer question, including in the process a technical examination of the subjective foundations of the objective question that is the very Kantian matter of the
aesthetic power of judgment: “Homer as the poet of the Iliad and the Odyssey is
not a historical transmission but an aesthetic judgment.”18 In this way, Nietzsche
raises the question of “style” as the distinctively critical or reflexive question of
scholarly judgment or “taste” as an objective and scientific question.19
In this sense, Nietzsche undertakes nothing less than a critique of philological judgment in his first lecture. For Nietzsche, the conceptual dynamic of the
Homer question, inasmuch as it fails to reflect on its own project, pursues a
circular path, asking if in fact and in the end “Homer’s personality, because it
could not be grasped, had gradually become attenuated to an empty name? Or
had one then and in naïve folk fashion incorporated the entirety of heroic poetry,
visualized under the figure of Homer?”20

JNS 43.2_04_Babich.indd 243

11/09/12 6:39 PM

244   Babette Babich

As a formula, Nietzsche’s articulation of the Homer question functions both
on the basis of and contra antiquity itself and on the basis of and contra its scholarly reception or critical interpretation.21 Thus Nietzsche is able to direct the
question of “personality” to historical antiquity—“Is a concept thereby created
from a person, or a person from a concept?”—while at the same time also directing the same question to the academic profession of classical philology itself.22
Functionally detailing a critique of scholarly (or as Nietzsche himself says
scientific) philological judgment, Nietzsche’s critically reflexive insight into
purely philological classifications of style thereby raises the question of the
subjective role of taste on the part of classicists themselves. If Nietzsche takes a
very specific position on the Homer question, highlighting and emphasizing as he
does the oral tradition (which, by contrast, many classicists today—surprisingly
enough—fail to do because they take it for granted or as somehow settled), the
same subjective/objective distinction includes a double allusion to the matter
of judgment and taste with regard to the Homer question in classical philology
in the past and in Nietzsche’s day as indeed in the present day.
The point Nietzsche seeks to make here with regard to taste is complicated
and to illustrate it I have recourse to a cognate distinction as David Hume makes
it (and Hume is the reason that Kant attends to the distinction between German
aesthetics and French and English taste) in “On the Standard of Taste.”23 In this
last of four brief essays or “dissertations,” written, so Hume scholars tell us, not
systematically as much as for reasons of filler, Hume points the culmination of his
argument on standards, objectively speaking, for what may be assessed or valued
as good or bad, by putting the question ironically, highlighting Cervantes’ twofold allusion to the same question of discriminating taste in his Don Quixote.24
Note that I am not arguing that Nietzsche directly cites Hume in his inaugural
lecture—although he does cite him in other contexts, especially with respect
to the same causality that was so important for both Kant and Schopenhauer,
arguing that Hume’s critique of causality was more “consequent”(and as I argue
elsewhere with regard to Nietzsche’s philosophy of science, thoroughgoing or
sustained consequentiality was the most important epistemological terminus for
Nietzsche) than Kant’s famous resolution of Hume’s challenge to the slumber of
dogma or belief.25 In addition to causality, everyone knows the phrase Nietzsche
borrows from Schopenhauer, who cites Hume in English, for his Untimely
Meditations, reminding one not to live one’s life on the retirement plan—“And
from the dregs of life, hope to receive. What the first sprightly running could
not give” (HL 1). In a draft of one of his reflections (a quasi science fiction
stylization inspired by Lucian’s “Ἀληθῆ διηγήματα” [“True Story”]), Nietzsche
cites Hume in German, still more significantly on my reading, in the course of
describing how a traveler landing on our planet would be underwhelmed not
by our species’ capacity for suffering, given our hospitals, our battlefields and
prisons, and the ordinary corruptions and messes of life, all of which are the
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most evident aspects of our human kind, but by the nature of our institutions for
cultural enjoyment. How, Hume asks, would he show “the cheerful side of life”
to this alien and “give him a notion of its pleasures”? Should he take him “to a
ball, to an opera, to court?” This alien “might reasonably think” that Hume was
“only showing him other kinds of distress and sorrow.”26
Nor is it my contention that Nietzsche means to allude to Cervantes’ Don
Quixote in this context, although, once again, Nietzsche elsewhere does invoke
Cervantes as a poet by specifically contrasting him with the pretensions of the
poseur (in HL 5) as well as by opposing him to the artist as such, regarded either
positively or negatively. Cervantes accordingly both instantiates for Nietzsche
the artist’s capacity for “taking play seriously,” (KSA 8:4[4], p. 40) as we read
in an unpublished note on the “[d]ifficulties” that beset the “[g]enesis of the
[a]rtist,” and stands as a very conventional figure of the enlightenment itself
and its “battle” not with “stupidity but with imagination: vanquishing the imaginary things of the mind” (KSA 9:5[16], p. 184). Thus Nietzsche argues that the
novel’s picaresque or crudely unkind lampooning of the dispossessed in the
wake of the inquisition—which same “inquisition,” as Nietzsche drily observes,
“Cervantes might well have fought against” (KSA 8:23[140], p. 454)—reflects
not the literal facts of the historical era depicted but rather the artist’s work as
such, deployed here against both an entire genre (in Cervantes’ case, Nietzsche
tells us, this would be the Ritterromane: knightly tales or chivalric romances)
and, as Nietzsche implies to Cervantes’ credit, “contra the whole of Spain”
(KSA 8:23[140], p. 454).27 It is in this critically artistic context that Nietzsche is
able to characterize Cervantes as a “national disaster” (KSA 8:23[140], p. 454).
Nietzsche is thus less interested in what one might or what one might not
think of the figure of Cervantes’ Don Quixote and his relationship with his ideals or with his Dulcinea or the other people he meets or his loyal squire, Sancho
Panza, than he is in following the thematic he expresses in his aphorism “What
Is Romanticism?” (GS 370). The achievement of the artist’s success is not to
be taken or assessed historically or scientifically, that is, in terms of his account
of the nature of the “things themselves,” as they were (or were not), but only
in terms of art.
For Hume’s part, Cervantes is invoked in “On the Standard of Taste” not
as an illustration of artistic writerly prowess but as an exemplification of the
kind of referentiality that proves over time in the case of literature to be a standard for the rightness of evaluative judgment between authors such as (to use
Hume’s own examples) Homer as opposed to Fenelon, John Ogilby as opposed
to John Milton, or John Bunyan as opposed to Joseph Addison. The question
concerning an author’s relative “quality” and the desired objective standard for
determining the same qualities turns for Hume on the capacity to distinguish a
writer of outstanding or durable— that is, “classic”—importance from a candidate doomed to have no more than a temporary or passing influence, and it
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is the “objective” or universal rather than subjective or individual judgment or
capacity for discernment that preoccupies Hume in “On the Standard of Taste.”
The text from Cervantes as Hume cites it is as follows:
It is with good reason, says SANCHO to the squire with the great nose, that
I pretend to have a judgment in wine: This is a quality hereditary in our family. Two of my kinsmen were once called to give their opinion of a hogshead,
which was supposed to be excellent, being old and of a good vintage. One of
them tastes it; considers it; and after mature reflection pronounces the wine to be
good, were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other,
after using the same precautions gives also his verdict in favor of the wine; but
with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. You cannot
imagine how much they were both ridiculed for their judgment. But who laughed
in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom, an old key
with a leathern thong tied to it.28

Sancho Panza’s claim is to a certain pedigree in judgment; Cervantes thus
lampoons both blood-based and arriviste pretensions to the same. Hume’s point
is that what serves as proof when it comes to subjective claims (qua claims of
taste) is not a matter of constitution, whether afforded by hereditary means or
by the imperative force of wealth, but empirical, testable, factual corroboration.
The wine has a leathern or iron taste if and only if, at the end of the day or as in
the case, at the bottom of the cask, there is leather or iron in the wine.
Questions of objectivity in judgments of taste when it comes to wine are conventionally so patent as to be numerical (in Parker points or monetary value).
Hence the judgment of wine, whether good or bad, also serves as a social indicator
of class, nobility, or wealth—and this is indeed the aristocratic subtext to be had
in Cervantes’ text. Here it is relevant to note Hume’s own education in wine less
in his original Scotland than in the region of the Loire, where he spent the years
1734–37 writing what would be his doomed Treatise on Human Nature. The
ability to judge or discern good wine or indeed, by analogy, good authors (and
we perhaps need to bracket the possible affective subtext for Hume himself, who
was, as we know, less than sanguine about the fate of his first book, again rather
like Nietzsche) remains the presumption even today in the wine-pouring ritual at
table (although this is arguably made more or less bootless with California-style
wine protocols, that is, modern chemical additives and industrial standardization,
duly signified by the ubiquity of twist-off caps).
Thus the humorous illustration of Sancho Panza’s kinsmen’s good taste or
evaluative judgment, objectively speaking, highlights Hume’s exposition of
the very problematic sociocultural stakes of a needed “standard” of taste for
the sake of distinguishing judgment or sentiment in Hume’s objective search
for “a rule by which the various sentiments of man may be reconciled; at least a
decision afforded, confirming one sentiment and condemning another.”29
As Nietzsche notes with regard to aesthetic taste in classical philology, a particular and peculiarly, if specifically subjective, presumption colors and cannot
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but color the assumption “that the problem of the contemporary circumstances
of [Homer’s] same epic is to be solved using the standpoint of an aesthetic
judgment.”30 As Nietzsche poses it, this cuts to the heart of a scientific field
based on subjective judgments of taste, judgments embracing the same objective
considerations Hume sought. For Nietzsche, every historical foray into the question of Homer, every resolution one way or the other, inevitably comes to the
same end, leaving today’s scholar with nothing more than “a series of especially
beautiful and prominent loci, chosen according to subjective taste [subjektiver
Geschmacksrichtung].”31
The philological scholar who makes a judgment on the Homer question as a
whole or who comes to some insight on one question or another or who merely
resolves the status of a word or a phrase is making a selection or a judgment on
the basis of or expressing his ineliminably individual or all-too-subjective taste.
It is this same personal, if certainly scholarly, “taste” that plays the decisive
role, once again, now in context: “What was left of Homer’s own individual
work? [. . .] The epitome of aesthetic singularity which each scholar was capable
of discerning with his own artistic gifts, he now named Homer.”32 We can see
Nietzsche’s point here by considering scholarly judgment as the ability attributed
to the classical scholar enabling him (or today we may also say: permitting her)
to identify a fragment in terms of its style. Such judgment is the test of scholarly expertise not only in classics but in archaeology, anthropology, especially
physical or biological anthropology, comparative anatomy, paleontology and
evolution, and art history.
Nietzsche, then, posits a literally scientific role for style when it comes to
scholarly taste or judgment, just as Hume articulated the question of taste as
a matter not solely of subjective estimation but objective confirmation.33 If
wine flavors (and olfactory notes) are today commonly described with language
referring to hints and tastes of elements—tobacco, vanilla, oak, flint—distant
from wine, this same objectively specific distance or tension is brought out by
Sancho’s kinsmen, whose “reserve of a taste of iron” turned out at the moment
of what modern media culture likes to call “the reveal” (that is, “upon empyting
the hogshead”) to have had a perfectly objective literality. At the same time,
and also like Nietzsche’s own references in his own lecture, Hume’s citation of
Cervantes functions ironically.
Nietzsche’s question concerning style in his inaugural lecture and Hume’s
question concerning the standardization of taste (good/bad) can now be rephrased
for the purpose of the science of aesthetics in classical philology, both in art
and indeed in science.34 Thus we ask: how are styles canonized? how are styles
recognized to begin with? Ultimately, Nietzsche argues, style functions on the
basis of so many pregiven canonic registers of taste, both collective and individual. The result in the case of the question of Homer, the individual poet, that
is, in terms of the “personality” of the same, yields the very specifiable, very
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identifiable identity of the author, in this case Homer in terms of the classical
texts traditionally identified as having been authored by him.
Once again here, philology, thus regarded as a science of institutionalized
taste and tasting, is the expert school in possession of the authorized ability
to identify styles. Like archaeology, philology locates ancient texts in their
chronological context. And it is by similarly differentiating between ancient
artifacts, and above all by certifying such differentiations, that archaeological
and textual discoveries are made. But by invoking the philologist’s ability to
discriminate between styles, Nietzsche’s critical point (and it is this same critical point that leads Nietzsche to remark in a letter of October 7, 1869, to Rohde
on his inevitable “trepidation” and even “shame” in this regard [KSB 3, p. 63])
is that this capacity is founded on nothing more exactly (or less methodically)
“scientific” than aesthetic judgment as such, taken with all its strengths and all
its weaknesses. The strengths in question are the most important for Nietzsche
himself, who was able to make no lesser discovery than the work of his first
book on the basis of aesthetic judgment, that is, attending to the music or sound
of a phonetic culture of writing in order to resolve not only the problem of the
“narrowest conjunction” to be heard between “lyric and music,” as he titles a
section of his lecture notes on Greek lyric poetry, but also to resolve the problem
of the birth of the tragic work of art out of the same spirit of music.35
Nietzsche never abandons this stylistic insight into the fundamentally aesthetic basis of classical philology and accordingly of science as a whole. Hence
Nietzsche begins The Birth of Tragedy by invoking the “science” of aesthetics as
such and in his Thus Spoke Zarathustra he recalls both his inaugural lecture and
the beginning emphasis of his first book, where he cautions his readers (thereby
echoing Kant’s critical philosophy of the power of judgment): “Yet all of life is
a struggle of taste and tasting” (“Aber alles Leben ist Streit um Geschmack und
Schmecken”] (Z:XIII “On Those Who Are Sublime”).36
Here, as I conclude this first section, it is not irrelevant to note that the same
classical determinations of philology as a discipline that Nietzsche mentions
in claiming that the outlines of the ancient Alexandrian grammarians continue
to frame or set the standards for the modern science of philology also play a
role in the linguistic designations as well as the methodology of the s ciences.37
But at this same point a historical contextualization of Nietzsche’s own formation is in order. For it is no accident that the theoretical or “scientific”
study of art flourished at the same time and that Nietzsche began his work
in Bonn with his teacher Otto Jahn, who in his study of the monuments of
history, great and small, that is, archaeology, was also engaged with this same
new discipline or “science” of art history (this more properly monumental
or archaeological engagement was, in addition to a critical interest in music,
what distinguished Jahn from Ritschl).38 Furthermore, and also by way of
Jahn, Nietzsche was acquainted with Gottfried Semper’s work on practical
aesthetics, Der Stil in den technischen und tektonischen Künsten.39 One may
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likewise note that the theoretical or “scientific” study of art deploys the same
stylistic terminology of philology.40 Thus Semper’s work covered the range
of disciplines identified as essential to philology for Nietzsche (as he himself
lists them in his notes, beginning with the archaeological and historical and
including the scientific and the mathematical). These same broad influences
are also evident in Nietzsche’s 1869 “Greek Music-Drama,” particularly patent
given Nietzsche’s cutting-edge opening reference to the then and still today
paradigm-shifting implications of the “fact” of the polychrome character of
ancient Greek sculpture by contrast with our conventionally monochromatic,
thanks to Winckelmann, or classically white vision of the same statues (KSA 1,
p. 531; cf. KSA 7, p. 15).41
The question of the source of Nietzsche’s thinking on style, a question that
in turn goes significantly to the heart of source scholarship (or the difficulty of
tracing influences), can be answered only indirectly, using such evidence as
can be found in Nietzsche’s inaugural lecture and elsewhere.42 It is plain that
Nietzsche’s acquaintance with writings on the theme of style, taste, and judgment
that he made through the work of Semper, Hume and Kant, respectively would
only be deepened as a result of a resonance with his friendship with Wagner.43
In other words, it is just what Nietzsche names “aesthetic science” (BT 1)
that makes the identification of kinds (of texts and authors, artists, artifacts,
and even cities) possible as a rigorous scientific modality. The judgment of
“style” is also the key to Nietzsche’s fundamental critique of empirical and
historico-archaeological no less than the text-based or hermeneutic dimensions
of philological research, recalling once again, the disciplinary conflict classically attributed to Ritschl and Jahn—to which disciplinary “battle of philologist
against philologist” Nietzsche also refers.44

Nietzsche’s Philological Experiment à la Jahn or Joyful
Science qua Satyr Play
Nietzsche, contra mainstream analytic-style philosophy’s rather bootless ambition to install itself as handmaiden to (natural) science (bootless because scientists turn out not to need the favors of philosophers inasmuch as science takes
itself to be sufficient unto itself, and that sufficiency includes explaining itself
to its public), undertakes to question the very notion of science both philologically and philosophically. Nietzsche further proposes to illuminate that same
the question of science by means of the resources of art, understood as a selfconscious, innocent illusion—a move that makes it possible for Nietzsche to
speak of science as “a ruse” (“eine Schlauheit”).
As ruse, as a “device” or techne, art serves to illuminate science and is thus
what Nietzsche named science’s “needful correlate and supplement.” Indeed,
the artistic or the technical foundation of art as such is methodologically
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i ndispensable for Nietzsche inasmuch as he argues that “the problem of s cience
cannot be conceived on the ground of science” (BT 2). Thus Nietzsche coordinates both science and art, differentiated only in terms of reflective awareness or
honesty. As distinguished from science (and from religion, as we have seen) art
is illusion with what one might call a good conscience. What is more, and this is
the joy both Nietzsche and Hölderlin celebrate in poetic and artistic invention,
art lacks the fundamental hostility to life that turns out to be characteristic of
both religion and science, just because art is the very foundation of life: “All
life depends upon appearance, art, deception, optics, the necessity of the perspectival and error” (“Alles Leben ruht auf Schein, Kunst, Täuschung, Optik,
Nothwendigkeit des Perspektivistischen und des Irrthums”) (BT 5) Against the
ideal of scientific truth, life inevitably depends on illusions, even illusions that
do not know themselves as such, “i.e., for untruths held to be truths” (“d.h., für
Wahrheiten 
gehaltene Unwahrheiten”) (KSA 7:19[43], p. 433). Nietzsche
describes the beautiful as illusion but in terms he names the life-essential or
life-sustaining illusions of art.
There are a host of difficult themes that follow from this, but for an illustration
to conclude, I recollect a well-known apocryphal account that can here be read
as reflecting the scientific or empirical heart of what might be called Nietzsche’s
aesthetic or that we might also call his phenomenological investigation of philology. This orientation is also evident in Nietzsche’s focus on the body, as this
attention is manifest from his earliest philological studies and is apparent in his
attention to gesture and demeanor (there is here the possibility of an extraordinary
philosophy of dance, as this also runs through his work from start to finish) as
well as to feeling and even, at least at the start, symbolic form.
Speaking thus of Nietzsche’s phenomenological investigations, we are speaking of the “aesthetic science” that concerned him from the start. These phenomenological investigations run from the musical character of the Greek language,
as Nietzsche began his readerly reflections on Greek music drama and dance
(replete with little illustrations—arsis/thesis—as I have had occasion to cite
them elsewhere), to a still more phenomenological and indeed performancepractice-oriented focus as he explored a related question at the end of his life.45
The question was one that Nietzsche’s early enemy Ulrich von WilamowitzMöllendorff had made central to his critique of Nietzsche’s first book. This was
a question concerning the role of sensuality, that is, the very explicit role of sex
in Greek life and art. For it was Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s claim in his devastating review of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy that Nietzsche had failed to
incorporate the folk- and orgiastic element of the archaic tragic tradition, which
he hints at right from the beginning with the indelicately obvious epigraph affixed
to his review from what might be characterized as Aristophanes’ reflections on
senility in the mocking context of a pursuit of a fountain of youth in his “Γῆρας”
(“Old Age”): “Condiments, vinegar, piquant seasonings, scallions, beets, highly
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refined sauces, leaves stuffed with brains, oregano—all delicacies for a catamite
compared to a good hunk of meat.”46
My editorial notes to the translation of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s text
(a translation done by Gertrude Postl in collaboration with myself and Holger
Schmid) show that I then took some pains to discuss this almost quintessentially
Aristophanic epigraph, not only noting the stimulant effects of foodstuffs (that
would be ancient Viagra, as it were), but and in particular calling attention to the
complexity of translating the word καταπυγοσύνη (“katapugosune”), which is
not rendered but only lightly glossed as “catamite.” Note that other candidates
for a translation are the not in fact more pellucid renderings on hand in Liddell
and Scott, “brutal lust,” or, alternately that offered by the Aristophanes scholar
Jeffrey Henderson, “pathic debauchery” or “depravity.”47 James Davidson, for
his part, simply writes “katapugosune” and leaves it at that in his excellent
Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens.48
Davidson, who does not, to be sure, refer to the Wilamowitz-Möllendorff translation, does go on to offer us a bit more English, referring to “lechery” in his
The Greeks and Greek Love: A Bold New Exploration of the Ancient World.49
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, who would himself become (among many other
things), an expert on satyrs, proceeds in his review to elaborate near the review’s
conclusion on the point initially suggested with his epigraph, explicitly mocking
Nietzsche’s account of the Greeks and their relation to nature and to sexuality.50
For Nietzsche, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff writes, “the phallus is no phallus: ‘the
unconcealed and vigorously magnificent characters of nature,’ neither do the
Greeks, the eternal children, laugh at grotesque obscenities. No: ‘the Greeks used
to contemplate with reverent wonder (the sexual omnipotence of nature).’”51
Critiques of this kind cannot but stay with one, and Nietzsche would answer
this critique in his Twilight of the Idols, with a very specific reference to the
same orgy he discusses in The Birth of Tragedy. In his end-of-life reflection
on the orgy as such, deployed by way of a kind of protophenomenological
investigation, Nietzsche argues for “the psychology of the orgasm as an overflowing feeling of life and power interior to which even pain itself yet serves
as a stimulus” (TI “Ancients” 5).52 Such an expressly physiological reflection
offered, according to the later Nietzsche, “the key to the concept of tragic feeling”
(TI “Ancients” 5), a feeling Nietzsche contends had been “derived as much from
Aristotle” as from Schopenhauer—repeating a clarification he had earlier sought
to bring to the fore in the revised subtitle (or, more accurately, his alternative
title) for the republication of his first book, The Birth of Tragedy; or, Hellenism
and Pessimism.
That Nietzsche needed more than a new title/subtitle (and more than a new
preface) to do this is obvious (and Nietzsche was well aware of this, as witnessed
by the concluding reflections in his last published book). I have elsewhere
argued that Nietzsche’s return to this thematic underscores his own recognition
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that Wilamowitz-Möllendorff would not have been in error in charging that
Nietzsche had excluded, or, more accurately, that Nietzsche had originally
downplayed, the erotic dimension in his account of antiquity.53 And it is important to note that Nietzsche’s emphasis on the Dionysian certainly did oppose,
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s critique notwithstanding, the more staid or “pure”
conventions of the nineteenth century.54
The question of the satyr is curious for a host of reasons, and some scholars
have argued that ancient Greek amusement at the satyr had not only to do with
the satyr’s relatively animalistic proportions (i.e., sporting an oversized phallus,
routinely erect, rather than embodying the more discreet because boyish phallic
ideal among the Greeks) but also with its notoriously autoerotic inclinations.
The satyrs’ autoeroticism was the result of the tendency of maenads to run
from them, which meant that satyrs had two options. Either they had to content
themselves with sneaking up on sleeping maenads in order to attempt to rape
them, not a happy option given its challenges, which were considerable, since
maenads, being semidivine like the satyrs, are not easy or helpless victims.
Or else they had to content themselves with masturbation, which meant that
given the durable or constant craving of the satyr, they would be constantly
masturbating.55 With this and related arguments, today’s classics scholars as
conventional as classicists have ever been, continue to endorse WilamowitzMöllendorff ’s supposed critique of Nietzsche, if indeed in Nietzsche’s spirit,
although today it is also ironically enough argued that Wilamowitz-Möllendorff
shared Nietzsche’s reticence to emphasize the erotico-scatalogical owing to the
climate of the times.56
But perhaps even on this seemingly simple question, Nietzsche himself continues to elude the scholars. We note Nietzsche’s own insights into ancient
Greek sexuality and especially its relevance, given the current context, for the
peculiar aesthetics of the tragic work of musical art. This erotic insight echoes in
Nietzsche’s reference to the tension between the sexes paralleling the Apollinian
and the Dionysian, which frames the opening section of his first book, is echoed
in the concluding sections, with their reference to music and architecture. But
Nietzsche, concerned as he was with other issues in addition, had made the
point regarding the utility of erotics only in passing, as we might say, following
after Foucault and Hadot as we do on such matters. And Nietzsche was—this
is important to underscore—fairly restrained as a person (and with this we
are back to the importance of the notion of personality with which we began).
Toward the end of his life, Nietzsche himself, aware of himself, highlights
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s not altogether unjustified critique of Nietzsche’s
original cautiousness in his first book.
By reprising this question at the conclusion of Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche
affirms his investigation into the tragic in terms of the very erotic dimensionality he had been mocked for glossing over in his first book (again and just to be
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clear, Nietzsche’s notes from the time make it plain that the point in question was
not at all lost on him), pronouncing the “Dionysian phenomenon” as ultimately
“solely explicable on the basis of an excess of power”57 (TI “Ancients,” 4). Here,
the language of an excess of force would have been explicit terminology (child
of the nineteenth century as Nietzsche was, and it is common to overlook this
in our tendency to take him as a contemporary), terminology in any case more
explicit than the discussion to be found in his first book. Indeed, in this later
locus, Nietzsche refers to sexuality and repeats his earlier references to the orgy
with every technically scientific (here, again, for Nietzsche the science of choice
is physiology) and explicit detail one might wish.
Beyond the salacious and its appeal, beyond Nietzsche’s own effort to vindicate his own claims in his first book, there is also the archaeological modality
of Vergegenwärtigung, as Nietzsche himself also and very literally “plays”/
personifies the satyr, and this of course would be the effect of Jahn’s influence
on Nietzsche. I have argued that such an effectively orgiastic, ineluctably physicalistic investigation stands behind the apocryphal report that has Nietzsche
dancing naked in his upstairs room in Turin, fully aroused, playing a flute.58
Where a physical scientist uses experimental models, an architect deploys or
uses a mock-up of a house, and we may call this the Polanyi dimension, as it is
an inevitably tacit dimension (but we could also speak of Machian experimentation, even of Pascalian finesse). This is also the part of science, from philology
to physics and biology, that cannot be taught: this is “talent” or insight or what
Nietzsche called Bildung.59 To this extent, scientific research involves more
than thinking, and science itself always includes as much technique or style as
technology. Thus if there are manifestly limitations to modeling or experimentation, empirical science remains an inherently unfinished/unfinishable project,
open to critique, feedback, revision.
At the very least, the eyewitness account of Nietzsche dancing naked, with
an erection, while playing a flute offers an empirical answer to the question of
whether it is indeed possible to play the flute, as satyrs are depicted as doing,
while dancing in a state of intoxicated ecstasy. In less fanciful explorations,
today’s physical anthropologist might undertake to fashion tools like arrowheads
and adzes or attempt to build fires, using local materials. By so doing so the
scientist has not and cannot have “proven” that ancient peoples in such a place
fabricated similar tools similarly. More modestly, he or she has demonstrated
the possibility of such a fabrication. What can be enacted, that is, what is actual,
what can be done, is perforce possible.60 And in this fashion of actualization
living his own research—this is Vergegenwärtigung—Nietzsche could play the
satyr for the sake of, for the joy of, philological science.
And it is in the modest—and that means limited—spirit of such scientific
dancing that we can read some of Nietzsche’s notes for the fourth, all-too-parodic
book of Zarathustra in his list of titles: “The Magician’s Song. / Concerning
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Science. / The Rose Speech,” adding here “The happy ones are curious” (“Die
Glücklichen sind neugierig”) (KSA 11:31[66], p. 397, cf. Z:IV “Of Science”).
For such seeking to know, for such joyful research, one also needs the same
“crown of laughter, the crown of rose-wreaths” that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra,
like Hegel’s and like Hölderlin’s Napoleon, sets upon his own head (Z:IV “Of
Higher Men” 18, 20).
Fordham University
babich@fordham.edu

Notes
1. As Kant appears to joke in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Germans
are the only ones who speak of aesthetics where everyone else speaks of taste (Critique of Pure
Reason, B36).
2. There are many discussions of Nietzsche’s style, to which I have contributed over the years,
most recently examining the relevance of his style for philosophy as such and the complexities it
presents for understanding Nietzsche’s thought. For those who think that Nietzsche’s style is no
longer to be associated with fascism or nihilism, it is sobering that a recent German book manages
to indict Nietzsche on these grounds; see Heinz Schlaffer, Das entfesselte Wort: Nietzsches Stil
und seiner Folgen (Munich: Hanser, 2007). For a critique of this position, see Babette Babich,
“Zu Nietzsches Stil,” in “Eines Gottes Gluck, voller Macht und Liebe”: Beiträge zu Nietzsche,
Hölderlin, Heidegger (Weimar: Bauhaus Universitätsverlag, 2009), 8–27. I make the argument
that Nietzsche “does things” with words in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science
on the Ground of Art and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) and elsewhere,
including “The Genealogy of Morals and Right Reading: On the Nietzschean Aphorism and the
Art of the Polemic,” in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Christa Davis Acampora
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 171–90.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” in Frühe Schriften, vol. 5, ed.
Carl Koch and Carl Schlechta (Munich: Beck, 1994), 290. The English translation I use in this
article is mine.
4. Tracy B. Strong has made this point in his reflections on rhetoric in Nietzsche, citing
Brian Leiter’s dismissal of Nietzsche’s style owing to what Leiter calls Nietzsche’s “penchant
for hyperbolic rhetoric and polemics” and hence Nietzsche’s tendency to “overstate” his case, as
Leiter puts it in his contribution to Stanford’s Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See Strong,
“In Defense of Rhetoric; or, How Hard it is to Take a Writer Seriously: The Case of Nietzsche,” in
Rhetoric and Political Theory, ed. Keith Topper and Dilip Gaonkar (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, forthcoming). For a contrasting point of view, however, see Berel Lang’s judicious
account of authorial style/responsibility in his “Misinterpretation as the Author's Responsibility
(Nietzsche’s Fascism, For Instance),” in Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses
of a Philosophy, ed. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2002), 47–65, and, again, Schlaffer’s Das entfesselte Wort. Indeed, the very fact that political
scholarly battles that some assume to be long finished are by no means concluded merits attention.
In January 2008, for example, the German art historian Karl Schawelka contended in conversation
with me that Nietzsche was no longer politically problematic in Germany, either in substance or in
style. But Schlaffer’s book was already in the local bookstore. Academic muckraking, as students
of Heidegger well know, is and always will be a growth industry.
5. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 5:289.
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6. On the question of ancient art as such, see Larry Shiner, The Invention of Art: A Cultural
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), chap. 1.
7. Hence if problems of classification were difficult enough when one could, using traditional
philological means, debate the difference between prose and poetic styles in antiquity, these same
problems are compounded by recent discoveries of the texts, as it were, themselves. I refer here
to the gold funerary leaves found in Thurii, Hipponium, Thessaly, and Crete (and even Geoffrey
S. Kirk, John E. Raven and Martin Schofield find it essential in their very traditionally classical
account in The Presocratic Philosophers [Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984] to
discuss the Hipponium text in their first chapter on orphic tradition [29ff.]). In addition, we
may also consider the discovery of several new papyri, the Strasbourg papyrus and, yet more
famously, the Derveni papyrus. But for a discussion of context with regard to what are regarded
as “fragments,” see Charles Kahn’s important reflections in his Anaximander and the Origins
of Greek Cosmology (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994) as well as both Indra Kagis McEwen’s
ingenious appropriation of Kahn’s insights in Socrates’ Ancestor: An Essay on Architectural
Beginnings (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 10ff, and, perhaps most usefully, Catharine
Osborne’s important first book, Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1987).
For a discussion of the range of interpretive accounts, from esoteric ritual to cosmology, see
Maria Serena Funghi, “The Derveni Papyrus,” in Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, ed. André Laks
and Glenn Most (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 25–38 in addition to Charles Kahn,
“Was Euthyphro the Author of the Derveni Papyrus,” Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, 55–64,
David Syder, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus,” Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, 129–49, and
Walter Burkert, “Star Wars or One Stable World: A Problem of Pre-Socratic Cosmogony (PDerv
Col XXV),” Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, 167–74. Richard Janko importantly assesses the
recalcitrance of scholarly habits of inclusion (and exclusion) when he notes the silencing of
alternate readings in the production of the definitive transcription of the Derveni papyrus: “By
using a simple but bizarre expedient, P. and T. have contrived not to acknowledge that scholars
other than themselves have toiled to reconstruct this text. They include no apparatus criticus!”
Janko concludes that the authors “have chosen to benefit neither from the scholarship of the past
decade nor from recent advances in reconstructing and reading carbonized papyri” (review of
The Derveni Papyrus, edited by Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parássoglou, and Kyriakos
Tsantsanoglou, Bryn Mawr Classical Review, October 29, 2006).
8. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 291.
9. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 292. Regarding Homer and Hesiod,
it is useful to go back more than a century in Anglophone scholarship to William Francis
Barry’s discussion of political tyranny in his Heralds of Revolt: Studies in Modern Literature
and Dogma (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1904), which reprises his 1894 contribution to
the Quarterly Review 184 (July–October 1896): 299–328, A. H. J. Knight’s Some Aspects of
the Work of Nietzsche and, more recently, Christa Davis Acampora’s “Contesting Nietzsche,”
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002): 1–4, as well as her “Nietzsche Contra Homer, Socrates,
and Paul,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002): 25–53, Alain Duplouy, Le prestige des élites:
Recherches sur les modes de reconnaissance sociale en Grèce entre les Xe et Ve siècles avant
J.-C. (Paris: Belles lettres, 2006), and Lorella Bosco’s “Das furchtbar-schöne Gorgonenhaupt
des Klassischen” Deutsche Antikebilder (Wurzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2004), esp.
chap. 5.
10. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 290.
11. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 281.
12. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 276.
13. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 276.Nietzsche remarks that with this
question one seemingly, as it were, discovers “for the first time the wondrous capacity of the
people’s soul” (“Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 291; cf. 294–95 and 298ff).
14. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 293, 279.
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15. See Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 278 in particular and the broader
subject matter of the inaugural lecture as I have been illustrating it here.
16. “Hermeneutical” is a literal if periphrastic characterization: “im Namen der Philologie
selbst, die zwar weder eine Muse noch eine Grazie, aber eine Götterbotin ist” (“Homer und die
klassische Philologie,” 305).
17. William Arrowsmith is quite explicit about his intentions in this regard in his prefatory
remarks on the translation he provides of “We Philologists” (“Nietzsche: Notes for ‘We
Philologists,’” Arion 1.2 (1973–74): 279–380.
18. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 299.
19. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 299. Wilhelm Amann, in “Die stille
Arbeit des Geschmacks”: Die Kategorie des Geschmacks in der Aesthetik Schillers und in der
Debatte der Aufklärung (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1999), discusses Dubos’s “ragout”
comparison (241 ff.). The abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos observes that one does not have recourse to
theory or logical rules in judging when comes to a stew but that one comes directly to precise
judgment (Réflexions critiques sur le poésie et sur le peinture [1719; Geneva: Slatkine, 1967]). In
the broader context of philosophical reflection on taste, Amman also cites Alfred Baeumler, Das
Irrationalitätsproblem (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, [1923]) and Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der
Aufklärung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932). For a comprehensive contextualization of this question, with
only a passing reference to Bauemler and without reference to Dubos, see Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Art
of the Modern Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger, trans. Steven Bendall (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000). For a discussion of Bauemler that makes a good case not only for
the complexity and range of Baeumler’s thinking but also for the importance of Baeumler’s reading
of the challenge of irrationalism in the case of subjective judgment or taste resolved by means of
proportionality, that is, rational measure., see Philipp Teichfischer, Die Masken des Philosophen:
Alfred Baeumler in der Weimarer Republik (Ph. diss., University of Magdeburg, 2008). A further
reading between Baeumler and Lukács would be useful, but inasmuch as Teichfischer offers an
intellectual biography (and as Lukács was directly instrumental in condemning Baeumler and even,
according to Teichfischer, destroying his work), this needed critical reading is not offered here.
20. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 293.
21. For a discussion of Nietzsche’s agon, see Christa Davis Acampora, “Demos Agonistes
Redux: Reflections on the Streit of Political Agonism,” Nietzsche-Studien 32 (2003): 373–89.
22. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 293.
23. “Of the Standard of Taste” is the last essay in Hume’s Four Dissertations (London:
A. Milar, 1757).
24. Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste” was appended as a kind of “padding” (and the
distinction is important to make, as it means that it was an occasional writing rather than an
afterthought) to ensure that the published text met the length required by the printer in order to
be published. For a more detailed discussion of the particularities of its publication, see Ernest
Campbell Mossner, “Hume’s ‘Four Dissertations:’ An Essay in Biography and Bibliography,”
Modern Philology, 48.1 (1950): 37–57.
25. Nietzsche repeatedly engages the question of causality throughout his writing and
connects this question with Kant but also with Hume. See, for example, BT 15 and GS 357, along
with Babette Babich, “Das ‘Problem der Wissenschaft’ oder Nietzsches philosophische Kritik
wissenschaftlicher Vernunft,” in Der Tod Gottes und die Wissenschaft: Zur Wissenschaftskritik
Nietzsches, ed. Carlo Gentili and Cathrin Nielsen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 125–71, esp. 162–71,
on causality and the innocence of becoming.
26. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pt. 10, quoted in KSA 7:29[86], p. 667.
For a discussion of Nietzsche and Lucian that also glances at Hume, see Babette Babich,
“Le Zarathoustra de Nietzsche et le style parodique: A propos de l’hyperanthropos de Lucien et
du surhomme de Nietzsche,” Diogène: Revue internationale des sciences humaines 232 (October
2011): 70–93.
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27. Nietzsche suggests such devastation is always the risk, intended or not, of successful satire.
28. David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste” in Hume’s Ethical Writings, ed. Alisdair
MacIntyre (New York: Collier, 1965), 282. See also Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” in David
Hume, Essays Moral, Political, Literary (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund 1987).
29. Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” 282.
30. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 296.
31. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 299.
32. Nietzsche, “Homer und die klassische Philologie,” 299.
33. For Nietzsche, the error, indeed the “Mittelpunkt” of the errors in this context, is the
precipitation of objective rather than subjective judgment on this same basis.
34. The question of style in scientific thought far exceeds the current context and is far from
a pat or settled question. But see, just to begin with, Alistair Crombie’s three-volume study, Styles
of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition (London: Duckworth, 1994).
35. Nietzsche, “Lyrik und Musik,” Frühe Schriften, vol. 5, 369ff. See also Babette Babich,
“The Science of Words or Philology: Music in The Birth of Tragedy and The Alchemy of Love
in The Gay Science,” in Revista di estetica 28.45 (2005): 47–78, and Frederike Felicitas Günther,
“Am Leitfaden des Rythmus: Kritische Wissenschaft und Wissenschaftskritik in Nietzsches
Frühwerk,” in Der Tod Gottes und die Wissenschaft, 107–22.
36. Cf. Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste.”
37. See for example, Alix Cooper, Inventing the Indigenous: Local Knowledge and Natural
History in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
38. Otto Jahn must be regarded as Nietzsche’s teacher, if only his “other” teacher, in deference
to the scholarly habit of noting only Friedrich Ritschl in this role. Ritschl, who was originally
Jahn’s friend and colleague at Bonn, had a famous falling out with Jahn and left Bonn for Leipzig,
with Nietzsche in tow. For a brief overview, including further references, see Bosco, “Das
furchtbar-schöne Gorgonenhaupt des Klassischen,” pp. 301ff.
39. See, in particular, Semper’s reference to Jahn on Greek vases (Der Stil in den technischen
und tektonischen Künsten, oder praktische Aesthetik: Ein Handbuch für Techniker, Künstler
und Kunstfreunde, 2 vols. [Munich: Bruckmann, 1860–63], 2:71). For the art historical
context of Semper’s conception of style and for its relevance for science apart from Nietzsche,
see Babette Babich, “From Fleck’s Denkstil to Kuhn’s Paradigm: Conceptual Schemes and
Incommensurability,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17.1 (2003): 76, 81.
See too the wide range of contributions on this theme in the conference collection, Stil und
Überlieferung in der Kunst des Abendlandes (Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1967).
40. This “scientific” style-orientation still dominates contemporary art history. See Alois
Riegl, Stilfragen: Grundlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik (Berlin: Siemens, 1893)
and Alois Riegl, Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste, ed. Karl M. Swoboda and Otto
Pächt (Graz: Böhlau, 1966) as well as Max Dessoir, “Kunstgeschichte und Kunstsystematik,”
Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 21.2–4 (1927): 131–42, along with
Heinrich Wölfflin, Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der
neueren Kunst (Munich: Hugo Bruckmann, 1921). Wölfflin, a student of Burckhardt during his
time in Basel from 1882 to 1886, was one among others who inaugurated the German tradition of
Kunstwissenschaft, that is the science of art.
41. For a discussion of Nietzsche and color in ancient sculpture, see Babette Babich,
“Skulptur/Plastik” in Nietzsche-Lexikon, ed. Christian Niemeyer (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 2009), 325–28, as well as, more broadly, Babette Babich, “Die Naturkunde
der Griechischen Bronze im Spiegel des Lebens: Betrachtungen über Heideggers ästhetische
Phänomenologie und Nietzsches agonale Politik,” trans. Harald Seubert and Babette Babich,
in Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik, ed. Günter Figal (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2008), 127–89. While foregrounding the importance of Semper and the Wagners, Harry Francis
Mallgrave notes the independent relevance of Nietzsche’s reading of Semper for his “Greek Music
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Drama” (Gottfried Semper [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996], 348ff., 350; cf. 139,
with reference to The Birth of Tragedy). For a discussion of the role of the historical evolution of
art in Semper’s thought, see Michael Podro, The Criticial Historians of Art (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1984) and Udo Kultermann, Geschichte der Kunstgeschichte: Der Weg einer
Wissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1981).
42. For a limited overview, see Werner Stegmaier “Nach Montinari: Zur Nietzsche Philologie,”
Nietzsche-Studien 36 (2007): 80–94.
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